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Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Some of Patent Law
by Joshua I. Miller*
I.

Introduction
Historically, the Supreme Court has compared
patent and copyright laws.1 These comparisons
frequently result in the application of some patent
doctrines to copyright law.2 For example, the Supreme
Court derived copyright’s secondary liability standard
from patent law.3 Following the Court’s example,
several circuit courts have read patent standards into
copyright law.4
The doctrinal overlap, evidenced by the cross
application of these standards, is not surprising given
the close relationship between the copyright and patent
regimes.5 Both patent and copyright arise from the
Constitution’s Progress Clause, which grants Congress
the power to “promote the Progress of Science and the
Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
* Candidate for LL.M., George Washington University
Law School; 2009-2010 University of Pittsburgh School of Law
Samuelson/Glushko Fellow; Lead Notes & Comments Editor, J.L.
& COM.; J.D., University of Pittsburgh School of Law, May 2010.
1. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188 (2003)
(noting in a copyright case that “the Court’s inquiry is significantly
informed by the fact that early Congresses extended the duration
of numerous individual patents as well as copyrights” and that “the
Court has found no constitutional barrier to the legislative expansion
of existing patents”); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879)
(comparing the “province” of patent and copyright).
2. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 440-42 (1984) (importing patent’s staple article
doctrine into copyright); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935 n.10 (2005) (noting that patent
law’s staple article doctrine does not exempt from liability those who
induce infringement).
3. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 440-42 (importing the “staple
article” doctrine as safe harbor to secondary liability for copyright
infringement); see also Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936 (holding that
patent’s inducement rule is “a sensible one for copyright.”).
4. The best example of this is the standard for copyright misuse,
which was first imported into copyright by the Fourth Circuit. See
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th
Cir. 1990). Other circuits followed the Fourth Circuit’s example
in adopting a copyright misuse standard. See A&M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2001); DSC
Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th
Cir. 1996).
5. See Dotal Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A
New Reading, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 421, 463-69 (2009) (suggesting that
the IP Clause should not be read disjunctively). Cf. Karl B. Lutz,
Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, 18 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 50, 51 (1949) (presenting the
IP Clause as providing two independent powers).
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and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”6 Both laws enable owners
of intangible property to recover for infringement of
that property.7 Even with the judicial recognition
of a close relationship between the regimes, recent
scholarship suggests that the two regimes’ constitutional
relationship is even closer than is widely accepted.8
Problematically, some courts have “delegated”
potentially copyrightable material to patent law.910 By
excluding these subject matter areas from copyright,
courts have withdrawn certain limitations on exclusive
rights that could otherwise apply. Specifically, fair use
is a limiting doctrine in copyright law that enhances
the promotion of progress mandated by the Progress
Clause, but the doctrine is not applied in patent law.
Copyright’s fair use doctrine is used to
promote progress in several ways. Although copyright
can act to restrict free speech, the Framers intended
that it operate to the contrary.11 The mechanism of
fair use ensures that copyright remains “the engine of
free expression,” and that it does not offend the First
Amendment. Fair use, therefore, operates to ensure
that copyright works towards its intended purpose.12
Perhaps more importantly, at least from the
standpoints of economics and progress, fair use operates

6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (copyright infringement); 35 U.S.C. §
271 (patent infringement).
8. See Oliar, supra note 5, at 463-69.
9. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use
in Patent Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1177, 1228 (2000) (discussing
the delegation of application programming interfaces to patent law);
id. at 1211 (questioning if patent law is the best form of intellectual
property protection for APIs, which are the “connectivity components
of operating systems that specify how a particular operating system
and its applications communicate”).
10. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv.
L. Rev. 1105, 1135 (1990) (stating that “copyright often results in
suppression of speech”).
11. Harper & Row Publ’rs Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 558 (1985) (“[T]he Framers intended copyright . . . to be the
engine of free expression.”).
12. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:
A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case, 82 Colum.
L. Rev. 1600 (1982) (illustrating how courts have employed fair use
to remedy market failure).
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to remedy market failures.1314 From an economic
perspective, copyright presumes that the market will
operate to serve social purposes.15 A market failure
arises where a socially desirable transfer is unlikely to
occur, such that there is an economic need for allowing
nonconsensual transfer.16 Examples of market failure
include barriers to entry and the use of intellectual
property rights to control the flow of information.17
Copyright can create these types of market failure.18
Where such failures occur, copyright operates to inhibit
progress, rather than promote it. In these situations,
fair use can act to remedy the market failure.19
Unlike copyright, patent law has traditionally
been centered on mechanical technologies.2021 These
scientific and technological fields have not generally
been susceptible to market failure concerns.22 However,
since the 1950s, non-mechanical fields have become
increasingly important in intellectual property law.23
Software and business methods are among these nonmechanical fields.24 Unlike most historically patent13. Id. at 1614 (“courts in the copyright area ordinarily assume
that reliance on the market will serve social purposes”).
14. Id. at 1615 (discussing market failure).
15. Id. at 1627-30 (discussing barriers to entry as a market
failure); id. at 1632 (discussing control of information flow as a
market failure).
16. See id. at 1627-30 (discussing copyright as a barrier to
entry); id. at 1632 (discussing the use of copyright to control the
flow of information).
17. See, e.g., id. at 1601 (noting that fair use has been used to
permit uncompensated transfers “not capable of effectuation through
the market.”).
18. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law
Technology-Specific?, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155, 1159 (2002)
[hereinafter Technology-Specific] (noting that most inventions were
still mechanical in the 1950s, although newer technologies, including
software, have become more important).
19. See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1197 (noting that the
justifications for fair use have “seldom been implicated in patent
law.”).
20. See Technology-Specific, supra note 18, at 1159 (noting
that patent has lost its “primarily mechanical character” over
the last half-century as patent has embraced biotechnology,
semiconductors, computer hardware and software, electronics, and
communications).
21. See id. (noting the expansion of patent to software);
Hearing on Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice Before the
Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 109th Cong. 8 (2006), available at http://waysandmeans.
house.gov/Hearings/transcript.aspx?NewsID=10219
(presenting
data on increase in business method patent applications).
22. Since both fields are also subject to network effects, they
raise special market failure concerns. See infra Part III.
23. See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1193 (“a brief review shows
that while some of patent’s scope-limiting devices bear a surface
resemblance to copyright fair use, none, alone or in combination
with others, functions as its equivalent.”).
24. Id. at 1205.

eligible fields, these new fields are susceptible to special
market failure concerns.25 Despite these evolving
concerns regarding new technological fields, patent
law does not have any limiting doctrines equivalent to
copyright’s fair use doctrine.26
Professor Maureen O’Rourke has made an
in-depth proposal to address patent’s lack of a fair use
standard. She proposed a five-factor test for patent
fair use: (i) the nature of the advance represented by
the infringement, (ii) the purpose of the infringing
use, (iii) the nature and strength of the market failure
that prevents a license from being concluded, (iv) the
impact of the use on the patentee’s incentives and
overall social welfare, and (v) the nature of the patented
work.
This paper agrees with Professor O’Rourke’s
general thesis – patent law does need a fair use doctrine.
This paper also differs from Professor O’Rourke’s
proposal regarding implementation of fair use in patent
law, arguing instead that patent’s fair use doctrine
should be technology-specific: fair use does not need
apply to all industries, but should instead only apply
to industries and technologies that raise network
effect concerns. Network effects arise in relation to
a particular product or innovation when each unit of
that product becomes more valuable as more people use
it. Network effects can make market entry incredibly
difficult, and can also enable small groups of firms to
control the flow of information, both of which are
forms of market failure.
This paper argues that patent law should have
a fair use standard that is applicable only to those
technological industries that can benefit the most from
the standard. Part II discusses justifications, including
those discussed by Professor O’Rourke, for importing a
fair use standard into patent law. Part II first presents
structural arguments based on the similarities between
patent and copyright and then proceeds to present
arguments for patent fair use based on market and
legal shifts. Part III argues that a technology-specific
application of the fair use doctrine can adequately
address the concerns raised in Part II. Part IV proposes
a modified version of Professor O’Rourke’s fair use
25. See infra Part III. Microsoft Windows, for example, is a
product exhibiting strong network effects. As more people use
Windows, it becomes more valuable because more programmers will
produce compatible software. As some software becomes exclusively
available on Windows, more people will want access to Windows. As
demand increases, so does cost.
26. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 1627-32 (referring to both
barriers to entry and information flow as market failures).
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standard that removes much of the recognized difficulty
in Professor O’Rourke’s proposal. Part V offers some
observations in conclusion
II. Justifications for Fair Use in Patent Law
Comparisons between the copyright and
patent regimes are becoming more pertinent as
the subject matter of the two regimes increasingly
overlaps.27 Four separate “structural” areas inform
such comparisons, and each area supports a fair use
standard in patent law. Beyond these structural issues,
concurrent market and legal shifts also support the
application of fair use to patent law.
A. Structural Issues
The Progress Clause grants Congress the power
to pass both copyright and patent laws.28 The Progress
Clause is commonly read in the disjunctive; in other
words, it is assumed that there are two separate powers
contained within the Progress Clause.29 The first is the
power “to promote the progress of science, by securing
for limited times to authors the exclusive right to their
writings,” referring to copyright law.30 The other is
the power “to promote the progress of useful arts, by
securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive
right to their discoveries,” referring to patent law.31
Recent scholarship indicates that the “two” clauses
were not intended to be separate, but were originally
intended to complement each other.32 If the two
clauses are indeed as closely related as suggested by that
scholarship, then perhaps there should be even more
doctrinal overlap than the courts have recognized,
including a fair use standard in patent law.
27. For example, business methods and software are both
potentially patentable. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3228
(2010) (stating that the term “method” in the Patent Act “may
include at least some methods of doing business.”); Id. at 3227
(noting that computer programs may be patentable). Additionally,
they may both be copyrightable. It is well established that software
may be copyrightable. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding computer
programs copyrightable). Similarly, if business method patents
place restriction on “human activity,” as Judge Dyk of the Federal
Circuit has said, then they may apply to expressive content, which
is copyrightable. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(Dyk, J., concurring) (describing business method patents as placing
limitations on “human activity”).
28. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
29. See Lutz, supra note 5, at 51 (presenting the Progress Clause
as providing two independent powers).
30. See Oliar, supra note 5, at 463 (describing the disjunctive
copyright power).
31. See id. (describing the disjunctive patent power).
32. See id. at 463-69 (discussing the roots of the IP Clause in
James Madison’s and Charles Pinkney’s proposals).
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The two regimes also share similar theoretical
underpinnings in implementation. In both regimes,
the constitutional requirement of promoting progress
is commonly viewed as a requirement to encourage
innovation.33 Encouraging innovation is necessary
because intellectual property rights are public goods
– once information is made public, more than one
person can consume it without depleting anyone
else’s share, and the originator cannot easily recover
for the use of others.34 Both regimes seek to balance
encouraging innovation with the ability to innovate
further.35 In both regimes, these goals are achieved by
providing a list of rights and standards of infringement
from which an owner can recover.36 Both regimes are
directed toward balancing innovation with protecting
an innovator’s rights in his or her creation, and fair use
helps copyright achieve this goal; therefore, it seems
likely that fair use can provide similar assistance to
patent law.
Third, it is notable that patent law has very
strict standards, which must be met before any
rights are created, while copyright has relatively few
requirements.37 Due in part to these strict standards,
the patent right is significantly stronger than the
copyright.38 It is therefore easier for a single party
to obstruct progress in a given field with a patent,
33. See Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Economic
Justification for the Grant of Intellectual Property Rights: Patterns
of Convergence and Conflict, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 439 (1996)
(IP rights are “second-best solutions” to public good problems);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326 (1989) (describing
copyright as a trade-off between the costs of limited access and the
benefits of providing incentives to create).
34. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law & Econ.
42-43 (3d ed. 1999) (characterizing public goods as defined by
non-rivalrous consumption and nonexcludability); Mark A. Lemley,
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex.
L. Rev. 989, 994-96 (1997) (describing a public good as one that
“may be ‘consumed’ by many people without depletion”).
35. See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1183 (patent and copyright
“seek not only to reward the first-comer who originates a particular
creation, but also to preserve sufficient information for the public to
produce additional works.”).
36. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (enumerating the exclusive rights of
copyright holders); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (granting patent owner the
right to exclude others from “mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or
sell[ing]” a patented invention); see also 17 U.S.C. § 501 (providing
for copyright infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (providing for patent
infringement).
37. Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 and 112 (requiring
proper subject matter, novelty, non-obviousness and enablement for
an invention to be patentable) with 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (requiring
only that a work of authorship be fixed in a tangible medium of
expression).
38. See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1186 (describing the patent
right as “more extensive” than copyright).
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particularly one that forms the foundation of an
industry or product, than a copyright. The ability for
one party to hinder innovation – and create market
failures – when it acquires a foundational patent
supports a call for a fair use standard in patent law, to
allow access for a follow-on innovator to that area of
technology.
Lastly, the two regimes employ different
schemes to limit the scope of the right conveyed, and
these schemes make it is easier for copyright to adapt
to meet new and innovative uses of protected subject
matter.39 The scope of a patent is established during
the Patent and Trademark Office’s examination of a
patent application.40 Once granted, the patent’s scope
is defined by its claims.41 The scope of a copyright,
on the other hand, is largely established after creation,
frequently through fair use.42 Fair use in patent would
allow the law to adapt to changing circumstances after
the issuance of the patent, just as it does in copyright.
B. Market and Legal Shifts
Two related shifts also support the application
of a fair use standard to patent law. The first is a
market shift. The second is a general legal shift.
These shifts have occurred together in something of a
symbiotic relationship.
At first glance, it appears sensible that
copyright law has a fair use standard while patent law
does not. Because copyright applies to expression,
including activity, while patent law is viewed as
technology-oriented, copyright often runs afoul of the
First Amendment because it can restrict expression
and activity, while historically speaking, patent could
not.43 Copyright’s potential restriction on free speech
39. Id. at 1184 (“[Patent law] is relatively less amenable than
copyright to adjusting the scope of the right once granted.”).
40. See id. at 1186 (describing PTO examination as establishing
the “metes and bounds of the inventor’s property right”).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall conclude with
one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming
the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”).
Patent claims set out the “metes and bounds” of what the inventor
claims as his invention. See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1186.
42. See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1184 (noting that
copyright has “few requirements for initial protection,” but that it
still has several scope-limiting doctrines).
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (protecting public performance of a
copyrighted work). See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517
U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (noting that the Federal Circuit was created
as an exclusive appellate court for patent cases in the hopes that
“increased uniformity would ‘strengthen the United States patent
system in such a way as to foster technological growth and industrial
innovation.’”) (emphasis added); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-151 (1989) (“The federal patent
system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging

is a market failure because it acts as a control on the
flow of information. Additionally, a given patent only
restricts access to the innovation as claimed, while
a given copyrighted work can restrict works merely
based upon it.44 A copyright may therefore cover more
“things,” making market failure more likely to occur
with a copyright.45 Fair use acts to alleviate these ills by
restricting the scope of the copyright.
These generalities of subject matter and
scope hold true in the traditional patent technology
areas, such as the mechanical arts. The traditional
patentable mechanical areas can be claimed in relatively
straightforward ways.46 The doctrine of equivalents, the
rule that an equivalent device or process can infringe
a patent claim even if not within the literal scope of
a patent claim, cannot easily extend a mechanical
invention’s scope.47 For example, depending upon the
language used in the claim, a screw element in a patent
claim can be equivalent to other fasteners, such as a
the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances
in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice
the invention for a period of years.”) (emphasis added); Paulik v.
Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (to be
patentable, a claim must further the purpose “of advancing the useful
arts - the process today called technological innovation.”). See also
James S. Sfekas, Controlling Business Method Patents: How the Japanese
Standard for Patenting Software Could Bring Reasonable Limitations to
Business Method Patents in the United States, 16 Pac. Rim. L. & Pol’y
J. 197, 214-15 (2007) “[T]he [Supreme] Court’s holdings in Benson
and Diehr are really stating a requirement that inventions must be
technological.”). But see Oliar, supra note 5, at 464-69 (discussing
alternative interpretations of the Progress Clause that could result in
patent protection for innovations outside the useful arts).
44. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a “derivative work” as “a work
based upon one or more preexisting works”); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The
specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention.”).
45. This statement appears to be contrary to that in the
third structural point, supra Part II.A, but it is actually not. The
only instances where patent creates broad barriers to entry are
foundational patents. A patent on a device that comprises legs, a seat
section, and a back would block most other forms of chair, including
rocking chairs, couches, some stools, computer chairs, etc. However,
such foundational patents are not the norm. Generally, patents
only protect a species within a given genus, not the entire genus.
Copyright, on the other hand, may easily cover more than a single
species through its derivative works doctrine.
46. See Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 18, at
1159.
47. There are two tests under the doctrine of equivalents. The
first, called the “triple identity” test, deems something equivalent if
it: (1) performs substantially the same function; (2) in substantially
the same way; (3) to yield substantially the same result. See Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608
(1950). Second, something may be deemed equivalent if there is
only an “insubstantial difference” between the accused device and
the patented device. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1997).
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nail, a tack, or possibly even tape, but it is unlikely that
the doctrine of equivalents will extend beyond such
apparent equivalents. The determination of equivalence
is somewhat simple and does not dramatically expand
the scope of a patent.
As the technologies that patent law
encompasses progress further from patent law’s more
traditionally mechanical roots, the equivalence doctrine
becomes more nebulous, and accurate determinations
of what constitutes an equivalent become more
difficult. For example, in Graver Tank, expert witnesses
were asked to ascertain the equivalence of two elements:
manganese and magnesium.48 Graver Tank presents a
more difficult question than whether a nail and screw
are similar, even though in Graver Tank the subject
matter is much closer to mechanical than some fields
now able to receive patent protection. In information
technology fields, where terminology is still
inconsistent across industries, questions of equivalence
are more difficult still. Experts may prove to be of no
service in these industries because of this inconsistency.
Where two experts may refer to the same thing in
different ways, or use the same terminology for two
different things, the value of expert testimony in the
equivalency determination is significantly diminished.
As equivalency becomes more difficult to determine,
the doctrine of equivalents can be manipulated to
stretch the scope of a given patent, which increases the
likelihood of market failure by increasing barriers to
entry.
Technological evolution and the development
of new technological fields have pushed the bounds
of patent law, making old standards increasingly more
difficult to apply to new innovations. Technology
has introduced significant challenges based on its
increasingly expressive content and its growing
potential to induce market failure.49
Although patent law’s increasing scope is
at least partially due to technological advances, it
appears that purely legal shifts have contributed to
the increase as well. For example, some have argued
that the consolidation of patent appeals in one court
48. See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610-11 (discussing similarities
and differences between manganese and magnesium).
49. See In re Bilski, 545 F.2d at 970 (Dyk, J., concurring)
(describing business method patents as placing limitations on “human
activity”). Also, because computer programs are copyrightable as
“literary works,” Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249, then they are a
form of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
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has created a strong pro-patent bias.50 Decisions such
as State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc.,51 are used as evidence of this pro-patent
bias and are characterized as sweeping departures from
precedent – in the case of State Street, for ignoring the
“business method exception.”52 Decisions like State
Street, whether or not they evidence a pro-patent bias,
have made clear that patent protection extends to new
areas of innovation.
Regardless of the motivation – legal,
technological, or a mixture of the two – the increasing
scope of patent-eligible subject matter is undeniable.
As market and legal shifts lead to eligibility for new,
non-traditional subject matter, the likelihood increases
that patent law will more frequently lead to undesirable
market failures. Structural comparisons with copyright
law and recent shifts in technology and patent law
support importation of a fair use standard to patent
law.
III.

Technology-Specific Application of
Patent Law

Historically, patent law has “worked” well.
Seemingly, innovation has been encouraged, and
patent law has generally expanded to encompass new
technologies. However, the viability of patent law was
not significantly tested outside mechanical fields until
the last half of the twentieth century.53
Patent law is written as a general set of rules
for a wide range of technologies.54 However, patent law
has not been applied consistently across technologies.
While patent law only rarely distinguishes between
industries on its face, courts have sub silentio applied
different rules to different fields.55 For example,
50. See Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s
Embrace of Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?,
34 Ecology L.Q. 713, 732 (2007) (“the unification of appellate
decision making in a single body had the effect of creating a strong
pro-patent bias in the interpretation of patent law.”).
51. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. 149
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding business methods patentable).
52. See Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The
Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing
Business, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 61, 61
(1999) (characterizing State Street as “so sweeping a departure from
precedent as to invite a search for its justification.”).
53. See Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 18, at
1159 (describing new technologies patent law has encompassed).
54. Id. at 1156 (describing patent law as “a general set of legal
rules” applicable to “a wide variety of technologies.”).
55. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 161 (providing standards
for patenting plants); 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (creating a special
obviousness standard for biotechnology). See also Burk & Lemley,
Technology-Specific, supra note 18; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
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biotech patents are more frequently found non-obvious
than those from most industries, but they are also
subject to more stringent enablement and written
description requirements.56 Software, on the other
hand, has been “excused” from the enablement and best
mode requirements.57 The difficulty patent has had in
consistency across technologies appears to be a thing of
the recent past.
Patent law has some fair use-like doctrines,58
but none of these doctrines, alone or in combination,
function as the complete equivalent of fair use.59
These doctrines are all rooted in mechanical industries
that have historically been largely immune to market
failures, but they do not adequately address new
technologies.60 Specifically, with the emergence of
technological fields that raise network concerns, such
as software and business methods, patent law is more
likely to result in market failures including barriers to
entry and the control of information flow.
Professor O’Rourke implicitly recognizes
the point that network industries raise special market
failure concerns. O’Rourke emphasizes one industry
that could benefit most from a fair use standard:
software.61 Part of what makes software special in
patent law is that it is among the new technological
fields that exhibit strong network effects. Network
effects arise when a good “provide[s] inherent value to
consumers that increases with the number of additional
users of identical and/or interoperable goods.”62 The

value of software, especially operating system software,
is largely dependent upon the number of people using
it.63 Business methods, particularly those used in
online transactions, similarly become more valuable in
each instance as the method becomes more universal.64
Network effect industries are susceptible to
major market entry barriers, which are a strong form
of market failure.65 Network effect industries also
enable one owner to control the flow of information
by placing limitations upon access: some goods
or application programs may only be available for
purchase through certain business methods or on
certain operating systems. Professor O’Rourke’s specific
reference to network effects suggests that only those
industries susceptible to these special concerns should
have a fair use standard.66
Because fair use is designed to mitigate
the harms of market failure due to the exercise of
intellectual property rights, a workable patent fair use
doctrine will remedy the market failures inherent in
network industries. Limiting patent fair use to network
industries further ensures that a fair use doctrine in
patent would address the same concerns of the fair
use doctrine in copyright; namely, it would act to cure
market failures. This limitation to network industries
also ensures that the fair use exception is not applied to
traditional patent fields, which have historically been
subject to innovation without a fair use doctrine.

Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575 (2003).
56. Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 18, at
1156.
57. See id. (“The Federal Circuit has essentially excused software
inventions from compliance with the enablement and best mode
requirements”).
58. See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1192-93 (“The scope-limiting
doctrines available to a patent court are the ability to re-evaluate
the patent’s validity and construe its claims; the reverse doctrine of
equivalents; the doctrine of blocking patents; the experimental use
exception; and patent misuse.”).
59. See id. at 1193 (“a brief review shows that while some of
patent’s scope-limiting devices bear a surface resemblance to copyright
fair use, none, alone or in combination with others, functions as its
equivalent.”).
60. See id. at 1197 (“the theoretical justification for copyright
fair use--the ‘market failure’ rationale--historically has seldom been
implicated in patent law.”). See also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing
how the doctrine of equivalents does not adequately address new
technologies).
61. See id. at 1211-35 (discussing software in the context of
network effects).
62. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications
of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 479, 491 (1998); see
Peter S. Menell, An Epitaph for Traditional Copyright Protection
of Network Features of Computer Software, 43 Antitrust Bull.

Professor O’Rourke proposed a five-factor test
for determining whether use of a patented invention

IV. Implementation: A Four-Factor Test for Fair
Use in Patent Law

651, 657 (1998) (“The defining feature of virtual networks is that
the value of a product depends significantly on the value of the
system in which it is a part. A critical determinant of the value
of a product, therefore, is the range and value of components
with which it is interoperable.”). Two prime examples of network
effect goods are telephones and Microsoft Windows. See generally
O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1212 (introducing telephones as a
network industry); id. at 1213 (discussing the network effects of
Windows).
63. See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1213 (discussing Windows
and compatibility issues).
64. Paypal is an example of a business method that gains value
as it becomes more widely used. The more websites and people that
use paypal, the more valuable it becomes.
65. See id. at 1179 (“in the market for operating systems
software, which exhibits powerful network effects, strong patent
protection can create an insurmountable barrier to entry while also
allowing a single patentee to direct innovation in the market for
applications running on the dominant system.”).
66. See id., at 1212-19 (discussing network effects industries).
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should qualify as fair use.67 The first factor examines
the incremental value of the infringement; the greater
the innovation over the claimed invention, the more
the first factor weighs in favor of fair use.68 The second
mirrors the copyright fair use inquiry, asking whether
the infringing use is done for a non-commercial,
indirectly commercial, or directly commercial use.69
Use that is less commercial is more likely to be fair.
The third factor examines the type of market failure
that has led to the necessity of infringement.70 The
fourth factor corresponds to the copyright question of
whether a work is transformative: if the infringing use
does not adversely impact the market for the patented
work, this factor supports a finding of fair use.71 The
fifth factor mirrors the first, except it examines the
patented work: when the patented invention is less
pioneering, fair use is likelier.72
The first and fifth factors bear examination
because of the special concerns they raise in network
markets. Just as the courts have difficulty determining
the “value” of a work of art, and should therefore
refrain from doing so, assigning a “value” to a given
innovation presents difficult issues for a court and
introduces substantial uncertainty into Professor
O’Rourke’s proposed fair use test.73 Courts should
not be asked to make such difficult subjective
determinations because they inject a substantial degree
uncertainty into the law.
While the risk of inconsistent subjective
determinations is present in examining both factors,
it is substantially greater in examining the accused
infringing product. For the patented innovation, there
will necessarily be evidence that speaks to the degree
of innovation. The patent application itself presents
evidence of what the inventor saw as prior art and
how the inventor thought his invention improved
upon the prior art.74 Because the patented invention
necessarily includes the patent’s prosecution history,
there will be evidence that can provide useful insights
67. See id. at 1205.
68. See id. at 1206 (discussing the first proposed factor).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1207.
72. Id. at 1208.
73. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 251 (1903) (stating that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking
for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations”).
74. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (“the prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO
and the inventor understood the patent.”).
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into the assumed contribution to the art at the time of
patenting from the perspective of both the inventor and
the Patent Office.
Unless the infringing invention is also
patented, the infringing product may have no such
prosecution history, which makes it particularly
difficult for a court to accurately determine the value of
that advance. Additionally, because a court would not
need to reach the fair use question unless the follow-on
innovation was within the scope of the patent’s claims,
there is the additional likelihood of prejudice against
the follow-on innovation in Professor O’Rourke’s
proposed test. This is because the new innovation is
covered by the patent’s claims, so regardless of the level
or quality of the innovation, the follow-on will appear
to be less innovative by virtue of falling within the
patent’s claims.
Turning now to this article’s proposed fair
use standard, because this article proposes applying
fair use only to industries that exhibit network effects,
the first factor of Professor O’Rourke’s proposal is
moot. Entry into a market subject to network effects
requires compatibility with the network standard, so
any advancement is almost certain to be extremely
incremental, and Professor O’Rourke acknowledges
that this factor has its least effect in these markets.75
Removal of the first O’Rourke element results in an
industry-specific test that includes four-factors: (i)
the purpose of the infringing use, (ii) the nature and
strength of the market failure that prevents a license
from being concluded, (iii) the impact of the use on the
patentee’s incentives and overall social welfare, and (iv)
the nature of the patented work. This industry-specific
test removes the most difficult and inaccurate question
in the O’Rourke test, resulting in a simplified, more
workable four-factor test for courts to examine.
As Professor O’Rourke acknowledged in her
original proposal, the infringing advance element has
little force in network markets, where compatibility
necessarily limits innovation.76 The difficulties
referenced above can be avoided by using this
acknowledgement to limit fair use to network markets,
thereby eliminating the first element of the O’Rourke
test.

75. See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1206 (stating that the
infringing advance element “has its least force in the case of network
markets where compatibility with the industry standard is required
for market entry.”).
76. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
While Professor O’Rourke’s general thesis
is correct – patent law does need a fair use doctrine
– her implementation leaves something to be
desired. She implicitly acknowledges that software
and other network markets are most in need of a fair
use exception, but she applies a complicated test to
all industries.77 Courts are loath to engage in value
judgments in copyright, and they should similarly
avoid making those judgments in patent law.78
It is also clear that patent law is applied
differently between industries, even when the law does
not facially distinguish between them. If other areas
of patent law can distinguish between industries, the
fair use doctrine should distinguish between industries
too. Such a distinction is important because it ensures
that patent fair use will promote innovation in network
markets, while avoiding further legal complications in
industries already adequately served by patent law.
By first establishing that a patent is subject to
network effects, and then examining the four proposed
factors, much of the difficulty in Professor O’Rourke’s
five-part test can be avoided. The innovative quality
of the advancement represented by an infringer, a
particularly difficult question given the probable lack of
reasonable background on the matter, is no longer an
issue the courts must address under this four-fact test.
However, the proposed test still examines the advance
represented by the patented work, which is well
documented in the patent’s prosecution history.
An industry-specific patent fair use doctrine
could alleviate many concerns associated with network
industries. By tailoring fair use only to those network
industries, the difficulties in a broadly applicable fair
use doctrine can be avoided. Finally, a patent fair use
doctrine can further promote the progress that the
Constitution mandates.

77. See id. (noting special concerns in network markets,
thereby indicating that the test applies to other industries, as well).
78. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251 (stating that “[i]t would
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations”).
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